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You're Only as "Free to Leave" as You Feel: Police
Encounters with Juveniles and the Trouble with Differential
Standards for Investigatory Stops Under In re I.R. T.
INTRODUCTION
In a classic scene from the musical West Side Story, a gang of
pugnacious teenagers called the Jets are clearly up to no good as they
linger on the moonlit streets of New York City! While the gang plans
the night's mischief, a police officer unexpectedly approaches,
blowing his whistle and calling out for the boys to "stop."2 One young
gangster grabs a novice compatriot and gives a whispered warning:
"Last thing ever is to let a cop know you're scared or anythin'."3 Once
you're a Jet, you're Jet all the way 4-calm, cool, and cocky, even in
the face of police interrogation.
Off the Broadway stage, most of us likely lack such fortitude.
Casual encounters with police invoke myriad reactions in different
types of people, even among the blameless.5 At one end of the
spectrum are those who welcome the presence of police as an
assurance of their safety and security.6 At the opposite end are those
who feel an immediate sense of intimidation and trepidation by casual
police questioning.7 Tempting as it may be to view an individual's
response to the police as a function of their respective guilt or
innocence, factors such as race,8 geographic location,9 immigration
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4. Id. at act 1, sc. 1 (referencing the musical number "Jet Song").
5. See CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:
RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 59-60 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing public perceptions of law
enforcement).
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 209-10 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (exploring circumstances in which encounters with police invoke anxiety
among citizens).
8. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 983-92 (1999) (discussing social science research on a
racial schema).
9. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The "High Crime Area"
Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment
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status,' and age" may influence the most upright citizen to react
nervously to law enforcement. In the context of the Fourth
Amendment, such visceral responses to police presence can take on
constitutional significance. 2 If one is naturally inclined to react
anxiously to police, one may feel unreasonably compelled to answer
an officer's questions or consent to requests that would otherwise
amount to a search or seizure implicating constitutional protections.1
3
In determining when a casual police-citizen encounter on the
street escalates to an investigatory stop,14 courts use an objective test:
whether under the circumstances a reasonable person would feel
"free to leave."15 However, a central question lingers: to what extent
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1588-89 (2008) (discussing
propensity of police to make stops in poverty-stricken neighborhoods).
10. See, e.g., Jennifer Pelic, Note, United States v. Arvizu: Investigatory Stops and the
Fourth Amendment, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 1034-36 (2003) (discussing
police stops of illegal aliens along the United States border with Mexico).
11. See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children and
Adolescents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 107,109 (G. Daniel
Lassiter ed., 2004) (discussing interactions between juveniles and police officers and
suggesting that juveniles are more easily intimidated than adults by the interactions).
12. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 330-31, 395 S.E.2d 412, 420 (1990).
Similarly, the North Carolina Constitution guarantees that any search or seizure must be
"supported by evidence." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
has stated that courts "may not construe provisions of the North Carolina Constitution as
according lesser rights than are guaranteed by the federal Constitution." Jones v. Graham
County Bd. of Educ., __ N.C. App. _, _ 677 S.E.2d 171, 178 (2009). Thus, the Fourth
Amendment "provides a constitutional floor of fundamental rights guaranteed all citizens
of the United States, while the state constitutions frequently give citizens of individual
states basic rights in addition to those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."
Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Serv. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 475, 515 S.E.2d 675, 692 (1999)
(quoting State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 648, 503 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1998)).
13. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
14. An "investigative stop" refers to the "seizure" of a person by police for a limited
duration that does not amount to a full arrest. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
635 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). A stop
does not require full "probable cause" but a lesser finding of "reasonable suspicion." Id.
15. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980). "We conclude that a
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave." Id. at 554; see also Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201 (explaining that
under the objective test, a seizure of the person has not occurred "[i]f a reasonable person
would feel free to terminate the encounter ...."); Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28 (stating
that under the free-to-leave test, a seizure occurs when police physically or by a show of
force restrain a citizen's liberty so that he does not feel free to leave (citing Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 554)); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.4(a) (4th ed. 2004).
FREE TO LEAVE
should an individual's subjective reaction to encounters with law
enforcement affect Fourth Amendment analysis?
In In re I.R.T., 6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals made a
subtle yet significant break with precedent by holding that a juvenile's
age is a relevant factor in determining whether a police encounter
amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.17 The aims of
this Recent Development are to examine the consequences of the
court's modification of the free-to-leave test and to argue that
considering a defendant's age, though appropriate in other legal
contexts, is inappropriate in the seizure analysis because it risks
subjectifying a legal test that is meaningful only by virtue of its
objectivity. The purposes of the Fourth Amendment are best served
by providing law enforcement officers with a clear, consistent, and
predictable measure of when their conduct or questioning will trigger
constitutional protections.18 Any legal standard for determining when
an officer's actions will constitute a seizure of the person must remain
objective if it is to provide practical guidance for police behavior in
the field and ultimately deter the abuses of police power against
which the Fourth Amendment was adopted to protect. 19 Imposing
differential standards for juveniles in the context of investigatory
stops risks subjectifying the seizure inquiry and most likely presents
more problems than it resolves. As a result, the In re LR. T. court's
modification of the free-to-leave test to account for the defendant's
age is ripe for reconsideration.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the factual
background and central holding of the In re I.R.T. decision. Part II
provides a brief overview of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
outlines the analytic framework for assessing police-citizen
encounters. Part III examines the logic underpinning the In re I.R. T.
court's determination that age is relevant under the free-to-leave test
and addresses the legal and common sense reasons age should not be
considered in the seizure inquiry. Finally, Part IV catalogues three
unintended consequences of requiring differential standards for
juvenile stops: (1) transforming almost any police-juvenile encounter
into an investigatory stop because age will inevitably prove
determinative in the seizure inquiry; (2) fostering uncertainty in
police investigation by forcing law enforcement to guess when their
conduct will invoke constitutional protections; and (3) establishing a
16. 184 N.C. App. 579, 647 S.E.2d 129 (2007).
17. Id. at 584, 647 S.E.2d at 134.
18. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
19. Id.
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slippery slope precedent that encourages further subjectification of
the free-to-leave test to account for other variations including race,
gender, and economic status that may just as legitimately affect an
individual's emotional reaction to police questioning, but if
incorporated into the seizure analysis would render the free-to-leave
test meaningless.
I. IN RE LR.T.
During an afternoon patrol, two police officers dressed in shirts
embroidered with gang unit emblems observed a group of young
people outside an apartment complex in Durham, North Carolina,
where previous drug-related arrests had been made.2" One officer
approached a male juvenile ("I.R.T.") and began asking him
questions.2 The officer testified that I.R.T. acted evasively by turning
his head away and by not moving his mouth as he spoke." On
previous occasions the officer had experienced drug dealers hiding
crack cocaine in oral cavities and he therefore "requested" that I.R.T.
spit out whatever was in his mouth. I.R.T. spit out what was later
determined to be crack cocaine and was promptly arrested for
possession with intent to sell.24 Following his conviction, I.R.T.
appealed, arguing the evidence should have been suppressed because
it was obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals first considered whether
I.R.T. was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when questioned by the officers. 6 The court explained that a police
encounter only qualifies as a seizure if "in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave" and recounted the typical
objective elements considered, including: "i) the threatening presence
of several officers; ii) the display of a weapon by an officer; iii) some
physical touching of the person of the citizen; or iv) the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's





25. Id. at 582, 647 S.E.2d at 133.
26. Id.
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request might be compelled., 27 However, the court's inquiry did not
end there. Despite the absence of North Carolina case law on point,
the court held that the age of the defendant was also a relevant factor
in determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave,
stating "the officer's 'request' could have been construed by a
reasonable person of juvenile's age as an order, compliance with
which was mandatory."'  Thus, the court held the officer's
questioning and request that the juvenile spit out the object in his
mouth-a seemingly casual encounter-constituted an investigatory
stop implicating the constitutional requirement that the officers have
reasonable suspicion 29 before detaining the suspect.3" Nonetheless, the
court went on to find that the juvenile's presence in a "high crime
area,"31 coupled with his evasive conduct in turning his head away as
he spoke, supplied the officers with sufficient reasonable suspicion
and the incriminating evidence obtained was ultimately upheld.
3 2
On the surface, In re LR. T. appears to take a hard-line approach
to police investigation: conviction was based on evidence obtained via
a warrantless search supported by little more than the juvenile's
presence in the wrong place, having turned his head away at the
wrong time.33 In a sharply worded dissent, Judge Calabria attacked
the majority's finding of reasonable suspicion and probable cause,
arguing that the holding rested on the controversial basis of the
27. Id. at 583-84, 647 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 553-54 (1980)) (internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at 584-85, 647 S.E.2d at 134.
29. The court cited several factors to determine if the police had "reasonable
suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot:" (i) nervousness, (ii) presence in a "high
crime area," and (iii) unprovoked flight. Id. at 585, 647 S.E.2d at 134-35. Standing alone,
these factors are insufficient. Id. However, in combination and viewed through the eyes of
a police officer with training, they can furnish sufficient reasonable suspicion. See id.
30. Id. at 585, 647 S.E.2d at 134. Having established that the juvenile was seized, the
court turned to question whether the seizure was constitutional. Id. For the seizure "to
pass constitutional muster," the officers were required to have reasonable suspicion before
detaining I.R.T. because a person of the defendant's age would not have felt free to
disengage. Id. at 585, 647 S.E.2d at 134-35.
31. Reliance on evidence that a citizen was in a "high crime area" to establish
reasonable suspicion is highly controversial. See Ferguson & Bemache, supra note 9, at
1589-90.
32. I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. at 585-88, 647 S.E.2d at 134-36. In addition, those same
factors were found to furnish the requisite "probable cause" for the officer to conduct a
warrantless search of the juvenile. Id. at 586-88, 647 S.E.2d at 136. The court explained
that "exigent circumstances" existed to justify the search and seizure because of the
danger that I.R.T. could swallow the drugs, thereby destroying all evidence or posing
severe risks to the juvenile's health. Id. at 587, 647 S.E.2d at 136.
33. Id. at 586-87, 647 S.E.2d at 135-36.
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defendant's presence in a high crime area.34 Without mincing words,
she stated that the majority opinion "eviscerates the protections of
the Fourth Amendment. '35 Judge Calabria's criticism on this point
may be meritorious,36 but both the dissent and the majority failed to
take a step back and recognize the subtle yet significant shift in
approach that occurred in determining the threshold question of
whether a seizure of the juvenile defendant occurred in the first place.
Far from "eviscerating" Fourth Amendment protections, the court's
novel approach to the free-to-leave test disproportionately expands
those protections in the context of police-juvenile encounters. As
explained below, looking to a defendant's age in assessing when a
casual police encounter escalates to an investigatory stop may entail
unintended consequences for law enforcement that cannot be so
easily overlooked.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SEIZURES OF THE PERSON
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures pinches a nerve at the core of any free society-the line
dividing personal liberty and government control.37 As long ago
articulated by the United States Supreme Court, "[n]o right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded ... than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law."38 To ensure that the Fourth
Amendment's mandates translate into more than mere "form of
words,"39 the Court developed the "exclusionary rule, '4° which
provides a sanction for government agents who violate the Fourth
34. Id. at 592, 647 S.E.2d at 139 (Calabria, J., dissenting); see also Ferguson &
Bernache, supra note 9, at 1588-91 (discussing the controversy surrounding the use of the
high crime area designation to find reasonable suspicion for investigatory stops).
35. LR.T., 184 N.C. App. at 596,647 S.E.2d at 141.
36. See id. at 592, 647 S.E.2d at 139 ("[Tlhe defendant's presence in an area
characterized by law enforcement as 'high crime' does not alone justify his seizure." (citing
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979))). Judge Calabria is to be commended for pointing
out the insufficiency of the evidence for reasonable suspicion justifying the defendant's
seizure, but full treatment of this subject matter is outside the scope of this Recent
Development.
37. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 1.1(a)-(d) (discussing the origins of the
Fourth Amendment and case law); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between
Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment
Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 508 (2001) (describing the
constitutional nature of freedom).
38. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
39. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
40. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 1.1.
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Amendment's prohibitions: the exclusion from trial any evidence
obtained through an illegal search or seizure.4 Thus, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment in conjunction with the exclusionary rule
serve an important public policy purpose: deterrence of unlawful
police conduct.
4 2
Although a central constitutional guarantee, the liberty and
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment do have limits.43 The
Constitution does not forbid "all searches and seizures, but [rather
only] unreasonable searches and seizures."' Reasonableness is at the
heart of the seizure inquiry, requiring a "balancing of the intrusion
against the legitimacy and need of the police action."45 Fourth
Amendment analysis centers on the inevitable tension between
liberty of the individual and restraint by the state-a tension that is
most palpable during an unwelcome street encounter between a
citizen and a law enforcement officer.46 As discussed below, however,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not extend to every
instance in which an officer interrupts a citizen's daily routine.47
A. Consensual Encounters, Investigatory Stops, and Arrests
A survey of state and federal case law reveals that police-citizen
encounters fall into three zones to which escalating levels of
constitutional protections apply.48 In the first zone, police casually
engage a citizen in conversation in a public place by asking questions
or making requests.49 Such "consensual encounters" take place
without the need for warrants, without probable cause, and without
any reasonable suspicion.5" As long as the citizen is at liberty to
disengage, no constitutional interests are implicated. 1 As the Court in
41. See id.; INGA L. PARSONS, FOURTH AMENDMENT: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
77-85 (Anthony J. Bocchino & Zelda Harris eds., 2005).
42. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 1.2.3 (2008); 1 LAFAVE, supra note
15, § 1.1(f).
43. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.
44. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
45. PARSONS, supra note 41, at 21.
46. See Steinbock, supra note 37, at 508-10.
47. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 2.2(b).
48. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-31; United States v. Saddler, 445 F. Supp. 2d 862, 867-69
(S.D. Ohio 2006), aff'd, 2007 FED App. 0805N, 254 F. App'x 527 (6th Cir.); State v.
Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 186-89, 424 S.E.2d 120, 128-30 (1993); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15,
§§ 9.1-9.4; PARSONS, supra note 41, at 15-39.
49. See PARSONS, supra note 41, at 18-19.
50. Id. at 87; see 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4.
51. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4; see PARSONS, supra note 41, at 18-19.
2010] 1395
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INS v. Delgado52 explained, "[w]hile most citizens will respond to a
police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being
told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual
nature of the response. 5 3 Importantly, encounters in the first zone
permit an officer to request a citizen's consent to a search or seizure.54
If such consent is voluntarily given, any incriminating evidence
revealed by the search is admissible against the citizen at trial.5
However, if the police questioning amounts to a coercive show of
force or a restriction of the citizen's liberty to disengage, the
encounter enters the second zone: an investigatory stop.56 Encounters
in the second zone implicate the Fourth Amendment, thereby
requiring that the officer first have reasonable suspicion before
stopping the suspect.57 In the second zone, the officer's options are
more limited. Absent a showing of reasonable suspicion, the stop
amounts to an unreasonable seizure of the person and incriminating
evidence obtained during such a stop will be suppressed from trial as
"fruit of the poisonous tree."58 Moreover, during an unreasonable
seizure, the officer's ability to obtain the suspect's voluntary consent
to a search is foreclosed.59 If an officer lacked suspicion to begin with
and the citizen in acquiescence to the officer's show of authority gives
consent to a search, that consent is tainted by coercion and any
incriminating evidence obtained is subject to suppression.6°
Lastly, a full arrest shifts the encounter to the third zone,
invoking the highest level of constitutional protections.61 In the third
zone, an officer may only effect an arrest, thereby seizing the
52. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
53. Id. at 216.
54. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201-06 (2002); State v. Christie, 96
N.C. App. 178, 185,385 S.E.2d 181, 185 (1989); CLANCY, supra note 42, §§ 10.4.1-10.4.2.1;
4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1.
55. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1.
56. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-31 (1968); United States v. Saddler, 445 F. Supp.
2d 862, 867-68 (S.D. Ohio 2006), affd, 2007 FED App. 0805N, 254 F. App'x 527 (6th Cir.);
State v. Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 187-88, 424 S.E.2d 120, 129 (1993) (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-55 (1980)); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, §§ 9.1-9.2.
57. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-31; Saddler, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 867-68; Farmer, 333 N.C.
at 186, 424 S.E.2d at 128; 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, §§ 9.1-9.2.
58. See PARSONS, supra note 41, at 78 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 487-88 (1963)).
59. See CLANCY, supra note 42, §§ 10.4.1-10.4.2.1; 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, §§ 8.1-
8.2.
60. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 645 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
CLANCY, supra note 42, §§ 10.4.1-10.4.2.1; PARSONS, supra note 41, at 105-11.
61. CLANCY, supra note 42, § 6.3; 3 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.1; PARSONS, supra
note 41, at 28-31.
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individual indefinitely, if the arrest is supported by "probable
cause."'62 Similarly, if the officer cannot show such cause or procure a
warrant prior to conducting the arrest, the exclusionary rule applies
and any evidence obtained will be suppressed at trial.63
B. The Free-to-Leave Test
Distinguishing consensual encounters in the first zone from
investigatory stops in the second zone is crucial in determining when
constitutional protections are triggered. 6' As the line dividing casual
police questioning from an investigatory stop is admittedly blurry, the
Supreme Court has long recognized the necessity of an objective
measure for distinguishing between the zones of police-citizen
encounters. 65 Under the traditional free-to-leave test, a person is only
"seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "if, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave."'  Courts have
repeatedly emphasized that the free-to-leave test is an objective
inquiry-the subjective intent motivating the officer to conduct the
stop and the subjective perceptions of the suspect as to whether he or
she felt free to disengage are irrelevant.67 The focus of the test is on
62. See Farmer, 333 N.C. at 189, 424 S.E.2d at 130 (citing State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C.
251, 259, 322 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1984)); CLANCY, supra note 42, § 6.1; PARSONS, supra note
41, at 28-30.
63. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 6.3, at 220-21; PARSONS, supra note 41, at 28-31.
64. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208-10 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting);
PARSONS, supra note 41, at 87-97.
65. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 574 (1980)); PARSONS, supra note 41, at 87-92.
66. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
67. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 228 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("This rule
properly looks not to the subjective impressions of the person questioned but rather to the
objective characteristics of the encounter which may suggest whether or not a reasonable
person would believe that he remained free during the course of the questioning to
disregard the questions and walk away."); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 n.6 ("[T]he
subjective intention of the DEA agent in this case to detain the respondent, had she
attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the
respondent."); United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that
suspect's prior experiences with police officers were irrelevant); United States v. Analla,
975 F.2d 119, 124-25 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the seizure inquiry is "an objective test,
not a subjective one" and holding it was irrelevant that the suspect's previous experience
with Moroccan police made him believe he could be tortured if he tried to leave the
scene); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 937-38 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
seizure test is objective and finding it irrelevant that defendant's father was a policeman
"who taught him to respect and obey law enforcement personnel"); Farmer, 333 N.C. at
188, 424 S.E.2d at 129-30 ("[T]he defendant had no objective reason to believe that he was
not free to end his encounter with the law enforcement officers and to proceed on his
way." (emphasis added)); State v. Christie, 96 N.C. App. 178, 184, 385 S.E.2d 181, 184
20101 1397
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the coercive effect of the police officer's conduct and how that
conduct would be interpreted by a hypothetical reasonable person
under the circumstances.68
Even a cursory glance at the wording of the free-to-leave test
invites skepticism and criticism.69 First, any legal assessment of
"feelings" seems ill-conceived as a judicial inquiry at the outset.
Second, commentators point out that in reality very few reasonable
people (let alone a criminal with something to hide) would feel free to
walk away from an officer's questions without consequence. 0 Lastly,
the test would seem to require the court to not only imagine a
hypothetical reasonable person, but also to enter into this fictional
person's mind, determine what that person believed at the time, and
assess how that person would think, feel, and react under the
circumstances.71 That seems a tall order even for the most prescient of
judges.
The free-to-leave test's usefulness, however, lies not in any
realistic psychological assessment of reasonable people's beliefs.7"
Rather, its utility lies in the test's ability to set up predictable
standards for police conduct that can be consistently applied ex ante
by officers in the field, as well as consistently interpreted ex post by
judges in the courtroom.73 The test is a valuable tool only insofar as it
(1989) ("The Mendenhall standard of whether a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave is an objective standard, not subjective.").
68. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a); PARSONS, supra note 41, at 88-91.
69. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary
Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
243, 250 (1991) (arguing that race should be considered in the seizure analysis because a
police encounter with an African American male is "quite different ... [from] an
encounter between an officer and the so-called average, reasonable person"); Steinbock,
supra note 37, at 523-27 (critiquing the reasonable person standard); Joseph P.
D'Ambrosio, Note, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intrusions or
Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 NOVA L. REV. 273, 285 (1987) (recognizing the artificiality of
the Mendenhall test); Lourdes M. Rosado, Note, Minors and the Fourth Amendment: How
Juvenile Status Should Invoke Different Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 793-96 (1996) (proposing that courts explicitly adopt a
"reasonable juvenile" test).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Notorianni, 729 F.2d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[Mjaybe
this is a wrong guess about what the average person feels in this situation, but it is the law
of this circuit."); PARSONS, supra note 41, at 88-89; Steinbock, supra note 37, at 523-27.
71. See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth
Amendment's Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 73 (2009) (discussing
the disconnect between the reality of how most people feel when confronted with police
questioning and the assumption by the Supreme Court that reasonable people feel free to
leave).
72. See id. at 60-62 (discussing psychological studies that conflict with the assumption
that most people feel free to terminate an encounter with law enforcement).
73. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
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gives an objective measure by which to gauge the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of police behavior under the circumstances.74 An
objective test, focusing on the actions of the officer rather than the
subjective reactions of the suspect, also comports with the underlying
purpose of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable
seizures: deterrence of abusive police conduct.75 As Justice Stewart
explained, the "purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate
all contact between the police and the citizenry, but to 'prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with
the privacy and personal security of individuals.' "76 Thus, any legal
test designed to interpret what conduct by a police officer is
oppressive or unreasonable "must be expressed in terms that can be
understood and applied by the officer. '77 In contrast, if a subjective
measure were employed and the reasonableness of police conduct
varied depending on the particularities of the suspect, uniform
standards of police behavior become impossible and abuses far more
difficult to detect.78
Further, an objective seizure inquiry allows for more precise and
effective law enforcement.79 Police investigations in the field require
quick decision making and flexibility.8" Upon approaching a citizen on
the street, an officer needs to know at the outset the constitutional
boundaries of a casual police-citizen encounter both to effectively
investigate potential criminal activity and to serve as a check on his
own behavior.8" The objectivity of the test allows police officers to
predict in advance when their actions or requests will implicate
74. See id.
75. See id.; Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 74 (2007) ("In its search and seizure decisions, the Supreme Court
emphasizes the exclusionary rule's deterrent function, suggesting that the Fourth
Amendment's primary purpose is to deter unconstitutional police behavior, and therefore
focusing on the reasonable police officer.").
76. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (quoting United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)); see State v. Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 187, 424
S.E.2d 120, 129 (1993) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1976)).
77. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
78. See id.
79. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (noting the need for flexible investigation
techniques and police questioning "as a tool in the effective enforcement of criminal
laws").
80. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (noting that law enforcement officers on
the street need "an escalating set of flexible responses").
81. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
20101 1399
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Fourth Amendment restrictions and protections.' As the Court has
noted, "[t]his 'reasonable person' standard also ensures that the scope
of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of
mind of the particular individual being approached."83 Therefore, the
free-to-leave test very well may be artificial in suggesting that
reasonable people normally feel free to disengage from an encounter
with law enforcement, but it provides a useful measure through which
to gauge appropriate police behavior both fairly and consistently.84
III. IN RE IR. T. AND THE TROUBLE WITH CONSIDERING AGE IN
THE "SEIZURE" ANALYSIS
In a significant modification of the free-to-leave test, the In re
LR.T. court held that a juvenile's age is relevant in determining
whether a defendant has been seized under the Fourth Amendment.85
However, the court offered surprisingly little rationale for its shift in
approach. The entirety of the court's discussion spanned exactly one
paragraph, which rather flatly concluded that the court saw "no legal
or common sense reason" not to consider a juvenile's age in the
seizure analysis.86 What follows strives to provide both.
A. "Legal" Reasons Age Should Not Be Considered in the Seizure
Analysis
Critical analysis of In re I.R.T.'s approach to juvenile stops
begins by probing the rather dubious legal analogies relied upon by
the court to support a modification of the free-to-leave test to account
for age. In considering whether age was relevant, the In re I.R. T.
court correctly pointed out that there "has not been an explicit
holding by the courts of this state as to whether the age of a
defendant or juvenile is a relevant inquiry in determining whether a
reasonable person would feel free to leave."' Lacking clear authority
under Fourth Amendment cases, the court turned to the Fifth
82. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) ("While the test is flexible
enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of
settings, it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless
of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police. The test's objective
standard-looking to the reasonable man's interpretation of the conduct in question-
allows the police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will
implicate the Fourth Amendment.").
83. Id.
84. Id.





Amendment for inspiration.' Though not directly equated, the
standard for determining whether a defendant is "in custody,"
thereby implicating Miranda warnings," utilizes a test remarkably
similar to the Fourth Amendment's free-to-leave test.90 The custody
inquiry also involves an objective reasonable person test that asks
"whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would
believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his
freedom of action in some significant way."91 Without directly citing
authority on point, the In re LR. T. court claimed that a "defendant's
age has been used to determine whether he was in custody."'
Supplying no further rationale, the court went on to hold that, by
analogy, the age of a juvenile is thus relevant in determining whether
a defendant was seized under the Fourth Amendment as well.
93
Even assuming arguendo that a proper legal analogy can be
drawn between the custody inquiry and the seizure inquiry, two
recent decisions reviewing custodial interrogations have held that a
defendant's age is not a relevant factor in determining whether a
suspect was restrained "to the degree associated with formal arrest."94
These cases cast considerable doubt on the authority relied upon and
analogized by the In re LR. T. court to support differential standards
for investigatory stops of juveniles.
88. See id.
89. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that a suspect must be
informed before being questioned that "he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him," and that he has a right to an attorney); see also FRED E.
INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 477-522 (4th ed. 2004)
(discussing Miranda and the law of police interrogations generally). In North Carolina,
Miranda warnings to juveniles are supplemented by certain additional statutory
protections by mandate of the General Assembly. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(a)
(2009). The In re I.R.T. court seemed to overlook the fact that juveniles' Fifth
Amendment rights are supplemented and augmented by statute, whereas no such
statutory provision exists for Fourth Amendment rights. See LR. T., 184 N.C. App. at 584,
647 S.E.2d at 134.
90. See PARSONS, supra note 41, at 19-20; Tara L. Curtis, Recent Development,
Yarborough v. Alvarado: Self-Incrimination Clause Does Not Require Consideration of
Age and Inexperience in the Miranda Custody Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 313,
313-14 (2005); see also State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338-41, 543 S.E.2d 823, 827-29
(2001) (discussing the various formulations of the test to determine when a suspect is "in
custody" for Miranda purposes).
91. State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992).
92. I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. at 584, 647 S.E.2d at 134.
93. Id.
94. In re J.D.B., _ N.C. App .... 674 S.E.2d 795, 799 (2009) (quoting State v.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338, 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (2001)), affd, 363 N.C. 664, 686 S.E.2d
135 (2009); see Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666-69 (2004).
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In Yarborough v. Alvarado,95 the United States Supreme Court
held that a seventeen-year-old defendant's age need not be
considered in determining whether he was in custody for Miranda
purposes.96 Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy
noted, "the custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give
clear guidance to police, while consideration of a suspect's individual
characteristics-including his age-could be viewed as creating a
subjective inquiry."97 The Court also pointed to the "conceptual
difference" between necessarily objective tests like the Miranda
custody inquiry and other inquiries that legitimately depend on the
subjective state of mind of the defendant.9" Justice Kennedy
explained, "the objective Miranda custody inquiry could reasonably
be viewed as different from doctrinal tests that depend on the actual
mind-set of a particular suspect, where we do consider a suspect's age
and experience."" Although Yarborough was decided three years
before In re I.R. T.,1° the North Carolina Court of Appeals made no
mention of it in its In re I.R. T. opinion.
Even more surprisingly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
itself recently reexamined the role of age in the custody inquiry and
explicitly adopted the Yarborough approach.1"' In In re J.D.B.,102 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a fourteen-year-old
middle school student was not "in custody" when questioned by an
officer in the school principal's office and reiterated the necessity of
an objective measure by which to judge the reasonableness of police
conduct.' °3 Citing Yarborough, the court of appeals explained that the
"objective test furthers 'the clarity of [Miranda's] rule,' ensuring that
police do not need to 'gues[s] as to [the circumstances] at issue before
95. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
96. Id. at 666-69. The Court also explained that "[ojur opinions applying the Miranda
custody test have not mentioned the suspect's age, much less mandated its consideration."
Id. at 666.
97. Id. at 668.
98. Id. at 667.
99. Id. Justice Kennedy went on to point out that the related inquiries into the
voluntariness of a statement can logically depend on subjective qualities possessed by the
accused, including the suspect's age, prior experience, education, etc. Id. at 667-68. For an
excellent criticism of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Yarborough as well as a full discussion
of Justice Breyer's dissent arguing that age should be a relevant consideration in the
custody inquiry, see generally Curtis, supra note 90.
100. Yarborough was decided June 1, 2004. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 652. In re I.R. T.
was decided July 17, 2007. In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 579, 647 S.E.2d 129, 129 (2007).
101. See In re J.D.B., _ N.C. App .. 674 S.E.2d 795, 800 (2009), affd, 363 N.C.
664, 686 S.E.2d 135 (2009).
102. __ N.C. App. -, 674 S.E.2d 795 (2009), affid, 363 N.C. 664, 686 S.E.2d 135 (2009).
103. Id. at _, 674 S.E.2d at 800.
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deciding how they may interrogate the suspect."'' 14 Further, in what
appears to be either an outright repudiation of its previous reasoning
under In re LR. T. or a case of judicial amnesia, the court of appeals
refused to consider the defendant's age in the custody analysis, stating
that an "individual's mental capacity and age, standing alone, are not
determinative .... In fact 'consideration of a suspect's individual
characteristics-including age-could be viewed as creating a
subjective inquiry.' "105 One is hard pressed to find a better example
of self-contradiction. Though the court was in conflict on this issue, it
did not seem to realize it.
Only adding to the confusion, an amicus brief filed in support of
the appeal of the In re J.D.B. decision to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina directly cites In re LR.T. to argue that if age is a relevant
factor in the seizure inquiry then (by analogy) age should be
considered in the custody inquiry as well. 106 Thus completes the
vicious circle: age should be relevant in the seizure analysis because
age is relevant in the custody analysis-yet age should be relevant in
the custody analysis because age is relevant in the seizure analysis.
Such circular reasoning was thankfully foreclosed, however, when the
Supreme Court of North Carolina issued its most recent opinion
affirming the application of Yarborough to the custody inquiry in In
re J.D.B., stating emphatically, "we decline to extend the test for
custody to include consideration of the age and academic standing of
an individual subjected to questioning by police."'017 Thus, despite
considerable confusion on the issue, it is now clear that age is not
relevant in the custody inquiry under North Carolina law and the
legal analogy drawn by the In re LR. T. court to justify consideration
of age in the seizure inquiry is no longer viable.
As indicated in Yarborough, the potential for confusion abounds
in distinguishing between objective reasonable person standards (like
the free-to-leave test) and other reasonable person paradigms that
legitimately involve a more subjective inquiry. 8 The standard of a
104. Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004)).
105. Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004)).
106. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Juvenile-Appellant at 10, J.D.B., __ N.C.
App. -, 674 S.E.2d 795 (2009) (No. 190A09).
107. J.D.B., - N.C. at _, 686 S.E.2d at 140 (2009). The court went on to state
explicitly that it found the reasoning in Yarborough "persuasive." Id. at n.1.
108. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667-68 (2004) ("There is an important
conceptual difference between the Miranda custody test and the line of cases from other
contexts considering age and experience. The Miranda custody inquiry is an objective test
.... The objective Miranda custody inquiry could reasonably be viewed as different from
doctrinal tests that depend on the actual mindset of a particular suspect, where we do
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reasonable person is nonetheless a familiar and ubiquitous legal
construct.' 1 Moreover, in other legal contexts the question of what a
"reasonable person" would do under the circumstances does take
account of certain personal characteristics including age." In
negligence actions, for example, the "reasonable person" standard is
altered to account for a juvenile's age under some circumstances."'
Further, courts often consider subjective characteristics such as age,
maturity, and inexperience to determine whether consent to a search
was given voluntarily." 2 What makes the seizure analysis different?
Negligence and the seizure inquiry serve a common public policy
goal: deterrence of unreasonable behavior.'13 However, an important
distinction lies in whose behavior is being deterred. In negligence
actions, the central question is whether the defendant's behavior
posed an unreasonable risk of harm to others."' The focus of the
inquiry is on the conduct and mindset of the defendant. Since the law
recognizes that young people need time to mature and develop,
children are not held to the same standard of care as adults.115 There
is simply very little deterrent benefit in holding a child liable for
conduct that he or she cannot be expected to foresee as risky or
dangerous.116 Thus, age and inexperience are legitimate factors to
consider a suspect's age and experience. For example, the voluntariness of a statement is
often said to depend on whether 'the defendant's will was overborne,' a question that
logically can depend on 'the characteristics of the accused.' " (internal citations omitted)).
109. See Kinports, supra note 75, at 72.
110. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 117-22 (Aspen Publishers 1999)
(discussing the consideration of personal characteristics such as infancy, old age, mental
disability, and physical disability under tort law); Rosado, supra note 69, at 777-81
(discussing the courts' consideration of age and inexperience in determining voluntary
consent, waivers of rights, and abortion decisions).
111. See EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 117-19.
112. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) ("In determining
whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and
the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included the
youth of the accused. ); Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal
Procedure, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677,694 (1998); Rosado, supra note 69, at 765-71.
113. See EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 129-32; Kinports, supra note 75, at 74.
114. See EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 129-32.
115. Id. at 117-19; see also MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW
100-05 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the tort liability of juveniles and the variable standard
courts typically apply in measuring the juvenile's conduct against that of a "reasonable
person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances" (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1977))).
116. See EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 117-19; GARDNER, supra note 115, at 104-05.
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consider in assessing whether a young person should be held liable in
negligence for damages resulting from unreasonably risky behavior."7
The seizure analysis is also concerned with unreasonable
behavior. However, the seizure inquiry centers not on the behavior of
the defendant, but rather on the behavior of the police officer." 8 The
goal is to deter abusive or unreasonable police conduct, not the
conduct of the citizen with whom the officer interacts." 9 To determine
whether a seizure of the person has occurred, courts turn to the free-
to-leave test to gauge whether the police officer's questions or
conduct would be interpreted under the circumstances as a show of
force such that a reasonable person would not feel free to
disengage. 2 ° Thus, the test focuses on the actions of the police officer
as they would be objectively interpreted in order to provide guidance
as to what police behavior will or will not implicate Fourth
Amendment protections."2 As the analysis should not vary with
whom the officer approaches, the subjective mindset of the particular
defendant is irrelevant and considering individual characteristics such
as age is inappropriate.'22 A differential standard for juveniles simply
misconstrues the purpose of the free-to-leave test and improperly
shifts the focus of the seizure inquiry away from the police officer's
conduct. 1
23
The consent inquiry can be distinguished from the seizure
inquiry for similar reasons. In the consent inquiry, the question is
whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to a search
by law enforcement. 24 The focus here is on the subjective mindset of
the particular defendant, not a hypothetical person.' Thus,
considerations of age and inexperience are legitimate factors in
determining whether consent was voluntarily given by a particular
117. GARDNER, supra note 115, at 97-101.
118. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a); Kinports, supra note 75, at 74-76.
119. See Kinports, supra note 75, at 74-76.
120. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
121. See id.
122. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 5.1.4.1.3 n.68 ("Inserting individual characteristics
such as age or race into the reasonable person test would suggest that the result in
identical situations would change based on who the police are confronting. Such a mode of
analysis and results seems inconsistent both with the purpose of the test ... and with
Supreme Court case law." (citations omitted)).
123. See id.
124. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-31 (1973); CLANCY, supra note
42, § 10.4.1; Bacigal, supra note 112, at 693-99.
125. Bacigal, supra note 112, at 693-94.
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defendant. 12 6 The subject of the seizure inquiry, however, is different.
Under the free-to-leave test, the court is examining not the
reasonableness of the defendant's mindset, but rather the
reasonableness or coercive effect of the police officer's behavior.'27
The court is asking what a reasonable interpretation of the officer's
outward conduct would be under the circumstances-an assessment
that should not vary depending on the qualities or sensitivities of the
particular defendant.128
An additional distinction is procedural, but of no less
consequence. Under tort law, the reasonableness of a defendant's
allegedly negligent action is a question of fact which is weighed by the
jury viewing the defendant's conduct in light of the mores of the
community. 129 The assessment of reasonableness in the seizure
inquiry, however, is a question of law and therefore decided by the
judge alone. 3 ° Thus, the incorporation of subjective personal
characteristics such as age may be appropriate in the negligence
context where the collective judgment of the community weighs in on
the assessment. 3' However, consideration of age is not appropriate in
the seizure analysis where the assessment is purely a judicial
determination.
Despite the temptation to conflate the objective and subjective
variations on the reasonable person standard, courts must be cautious
in maintaining the conceptual distinctions between the objective free-
to-leave test and the more subjective standards in the context of
negligence and consent. 112 The utility of the free-to-leave test-
providing uniform standards of police conduct-is undermined by
incorporating too many subjective factors into the analysis that tend
to shift focus away from the reasonableness of the police officer's
126. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 388 (3d
Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant's consent to search his bag was voluntarily given
because nothing suggested that the defendant's age or intelligence prevented him from
understanding the situation).
127. See Kinports, supra note 75, at 74-75.
128. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a); Kinports, supra note 75, at 74-75.
129. See EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 163-71.
130. See Steinbock, supra note 37, at 524-25. Similarly, the determination of whether a
defendant voluntarily consented to a search is held to be a question of fact, but that
determination is made by the trial judge. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996);
State v. Early, - N.C. App .... 670 S.E.2d 594, 601 (2009); CLANCY, supra note 42,
§ 10.4.2.2.
131. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 10.4.2.2; EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 163-71.
132. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667-68 (2004).
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conduct and focus instead on the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of
the individual suspect.133
B. "Common Sense" Reasons Age Should Not be Considered in the
Seizure Analysis
The In re I.R.T. approach to juvenile stops may be based on
tenuous legal authority, but are there independent common sense
reasons to treat juveniles differently in the seizure analysis? What
follows addresses two common sense concerns with differential
standards for investigatory stops of juveniles: (1) whether age is truly
a "subjective" matter that should be excluded from an objective
seizure inquiry, and (2) whether social science studies suggesting
juveniles are more susceptible to influence by authority figures should
affect the role of age in the seizure inquiry.
As explained above, courts describe the free-to-leave test as an
objective inquiry focusing on how a hypothetical reasonable person
would react to police under the circumstances of the encounter and
excluding from consideration the subjective qualities and perceptions
of the individual suspect."3 But in deciding whether age is an
appropriate factor under the free-to-leave test, merely reiterating that
the seizure inquiry is "objective" only begs the question. The central
query remains: Is age itself a subjective or objective factor?
In one sense, age is an objective determination. The number of
years an individual has been alive is clearly quantifiable-a person is
either seventeen years old or eighteen years old. Further, an
individual's age reflects certain societal assumptions about maturity,
rationality, and emotional capacity.'35 However, the role of a suspect's
juvenile status in the context of a more or less random street
encounter with law enforcement is a bit more complicated. First, a
suspect's age is only an objective fact under the circumstances of a
police encounter if it is made known to the officer.'36 As an
individual's exact age is not readily apparent upon first approach, an
officer may not have any reason to know of the individual's juvenile
status during a street encounter. When unknown to the officer, a
suspect's age hardly constitutes an objective element of the
underlying circumstances surrounding the stop. Further, imposing
133. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
134. See supra Part III.A.
135. See GARDNER, supra note 115, at 3-7.
136. See In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 501 n.5 (D.C. 1992) ("The record provides no support
for an argument that Detective Zattau should have recognized ... him to be a juvenile
rather than a young adult.").
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differential standards for what police conduct will implicate the
Fourth Amendment in such a situation cannot serve the policy goal of
deterrence of unreasonable police behavior: there is no way to deter
an officer from conducting herself unreasonably with a juvenile
suspect if the officer is unaware that the suspect was a juvenile at the
outset.
Second, even if the officer has reason to believe a suspect is a
juvenile, considering an individual's age in determining whether a
seizure occurred inevitably invites a more subjective inquiry. For
those untrained in psychology and human development, basic
assumptions about the relative maturity of disparate age groups are
often unscientific, arbitrary, and inconsistent.'37 If a judge must
consider a suspect's age in the seizure inquiry, the temptation is to
compensate for a lack of knowledge about a particular age group by
looking instead to how this particular juvenile subjectively reacted to
the police encounter.'38 The In re LR.T. court's consideration of
defendant's juvenile status is illustrative, as the court seemed to use
age to reorient the seizure inquiry itself.'39 Rather than consider age
as one factor subsumed in the circumstances, the court reexamined
the facts of the encounter through the perspective of a juvenile-
attempting to see all of the events as a juvenile would see them.1
40
Thus, the officer's presence seemed more intimidating, the officer's
gun appeared more ominous, and the officer's requests became far
more authoritative and commanding. The court's approach shifted
the focus of the inquiry away from the outward conduct of the police
officer and centered instead on the perceptions of the juvenile
suspect.' 4' However, this is exactly the kind of subjective inquiry that
is inappropriate under the free-to-leave test's objective reasonable
person standard."42 The policy goals underpinning the Fourth
137. See Kessler, supra note 71, at 81-87 (discussing that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence needs to be supplemented by empirical research and psychological studies
on human behavior because judges are often unrealistic in assessing reasonable people's
beliefs in the context of police encounters).
138. See id.
139. See In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 584-85, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2007).
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 640 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that the test governing seizures of the person "looks not to the subjective
perceptions of the person questioned, but rather, to the objective characteristics of the
encounter"); United States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
seizure inquiry is "an objective test, not a subjective one"); State v. Christie, 96 N.C. App.
178, 184, 385 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1989) ("The Mendenhall standard of whether a reasonable
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Amendment-deterrence of abusive police conduct and
establishment of uniform standards of police behavior 14 3-cannot be
furthered by fantasizing about how individuals of different ages and
various stages of maturation might interpret an encounter with law
enforcement. Modifying the seizure inquiry to account for the
defendant's age only encourages judges to incorporate vague
subjective elements into the analysis and to attempt psychological
assessments of a juvenile's reaction to police presence, which courts
are simply ill-equipped to make.144 In sum, although an individual's
age is in some sense an objective fact if made known to the officer,
the use of age as a factor in the seizure inquiry inevitably invites
other, potentially subjective factors naturally associated with a person
of the defendant's age to creep into the analysis, shifting focus away
from the proper subject of the free-to-leave test-the conduct of the
police officer under the circumstances.
145
Apart from defining age as either subjective or objective, there is
an additional common sense consideration in assessing whether the
seizure inquiry should be modified for juveniles. For many years,
courts have expressed concern that juveniles require additional
protections to secure their constitutional rights.146  Further,
psychological studies suggest that juveniles may not share the same
sense of autonomy or the decision-making acuity of adults and thus
may be unduly influenced by authority figures.147 These studies have
proved persuasive in convincing several state legislatures to protect
juveniles from aggressive police interrogation techniques that employ
sophisticated methods of psychological coercion to wrestle
confessions out of unsuspecting criminal suspects. 148 Although the
spontaneity of street encounters with law enforcement ensures such
person would have believed that he was not free to leave is an objective standard, not
subjective.").
143. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
144. See Kessler, supra note 71, at 81-87.
145. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
146. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) ("[T]he greatest care must be taken to assure
that the admission [by a juvenile] was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not
coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598-601 (1948)
(finding that a confession wrestled from a fifteen-year-old boy after five hours of police
questioning violated due process rights).
147. See Rosado, supra note 69, at 781-95 (discussing various studies and psychological
development theories that suggest that adolescents have less ability to understand the
consequences of their actions and are more susceptible to coercion by authority figures).
148. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(a) (2009) (mandating heightened protections
for juveniles under police interrogations); see also INBAU ET AL., supra note 89, at 521
(discussing similar juvenile interrogation statutes in several other jurisdictions).
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psychological techniques are unlikely to be used in casual police
questioning, the vulnerability of impressionable juveniles in the face
of authority remains a potential concern. 49 If, as studies suggest,
juveniles are naturally intimidated by police presence, they may not
feel comfortable simply walking away from an officer's questions. 150
Does not this fact weigh in favor of differential standards for
investigatory stops of juveniles as a matter of common sense?
Such an argument seems compelling, but for one problem: these
studies also suggest that the courage to walk away from a police
encounter simply does not increase with age.' Adults as well as
juveniles rarely, if ever, feel truly free to leave.'52 As one
commentator has opined, "empirical studies over the last several
decades on the social psychology of compliance, conformity, social
influence, and politeness have all converged on a single conclusion:
the extent to which people feel free to refuse to comply is extremely
limited under situationally induced pressures."' 53
Courts and scholars have repeatedly noted that the free-to-leave
test is a highly unrealistic judicial construct that stretches credulity to
149. See Rosado, supra note 69, at 781-94.
150. See id.
151. See Matthew Phillips, Effective Warnings Before Consent Searches: Practical,
Necessary and Desirable, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185, 1207-08 (2008) (discussing
psychological studies that suggest the inherent coercive nature of a police-citizen
encounter pressures the majority of adult citizens to acquiesce to demands by police). See
generally John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109 (2007) (exploring
cases and studies in depth and questioning whether citizens really ever give voluntary
consent given the psychological and social pressures that accompany a police-citizen
encounter).
152. See Denis J. Callahan, The Long Distance Remand: Florida v. Bostick and the Re-
Awakened Bus Search Battlefront in the War on Drugs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 408
(2001) ("In Milgram's experiments.., the principal finding was 'the extreme willingness of
adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority,' regardless of the
ramifications." (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN
EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 5 (1969))); Kessler, supra note 71, at 73 (finding that most people
do not feel free to leave when stopped and questioned by law enforcement on the street or
on a bus and finding that women and adults under twenty-five feel even less free to leave);
Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175,
193 (1991) ("Both law and psychology point to the same conclusion-consent in reality is
consentless."); Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Search Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 800-17 (2005) (discussing
psychological studies on obedience to authority and obedience to uniformed officials that
demonstrate the compelling effect of the social authority most people associate with law
enforcement) (citing Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 47, 47 (1974)); see also Maclin, supra note 69, at 243-50 (discussing
intimidation in police encounters with African American adult males).
153. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion,
2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 155-56 (2002) (discussing coerced consent during police
encounters in connection with various psychological studies).
FREE TO LEAVE
its limits in assuming that any reasonable person (young or old; guilty
or innocent) would literally feel free to leave and ignore a police
officer's questions without consequence. 5 4 But the free-to-leave test
was never meant to be taken literally. 155 The test may be artificial, but
it is useful insofar as it provides an objective means by which to
measure the reasonableness of police conduct. 156 If the free-to-leave
test is a fiction for juveniles and adults alike,157 there is little common
sense in interpreting the test literally for juvenile suspects while
ignoring whether a suspect literally (or subjectively) felt free to leave
in every other context. An officer's bullet is equally deadly to adults
and juveniles alike. An officer's handcuffs work just as well to restrain
the wrists of adults as well as adolescents. The sense of intimidation
associated with an unwelcome encounter with law enforcement and
the corresponding ignorance of the right to walk away plagues
citizens of all ages.158 Thus, the argument that juveniles require
heightened protections during street encounters with police simply by
virtue of psychological pressures or an ignorance of a right to
disengage is severely undermined by the fact that most adults feel
exactly the same way.
159
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE IN RE I.R. T. APPROACH
TO JUVENILE STOPS
As explained above, In re LR.T's approach to juvenile stops
marked a significant departure from the traditional application of the
154. See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a) ("Thus, if the ultimate issue is
perceived as being whether the suspect 'would feel free to walk away,' then virtually all
police-citizen encounters must in fact be deemed to involve a Fourth Amendment seizure.
The Mendenhall-Royer standard should not be given such a literal reading as to produce
such a result." (internal citations omitted)).
155. See id.; Kessler, supra note 71, at 81-83 (discussing the free-to-leave test and how
it has been applied without regard to the reality of how defendants actually felt during the
encounter). Further, asking whether a suspect literally felt free to leave requires a far
more subjective inquiry into the suspect's state of mind than is called for under the seizure
analysis. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 640 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating the test governing seizures of the person "looks not to the subjective perceptions
of the person questioned, but rather, to the objective characteristics of the encounter");
United States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the seizure inquiry
is "an objective test, not a subjective one"); State v. Christie, 96 N.C. App. 178, 184, 385
S.E.2d 181, 184 (1989) ("The Mendenhall standard of whether a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave is an objective standard, not subjective.").
156. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a); Kinports, supra note 75, at 74.
157. See Kessler, supra note 71, at 73.
158. See id.; Nadler, supra note 153, at 155-56.
159. See Nadler, supra note 153, at 155-56. But see Rosado, supra note 69, at 770-96
(arguing that psychological studies of adolescents provide a basis for adjusting the
reasonable person standard to account for age and immaturity).
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free-to-leave test by considering the age of the defendant in the
seizure inquiry."6 The result was a reorientation of the seizure
analysis that shifted focus away from an objective assessment of the
officer's conduct to focus instead on the juvenile's subjective
perceptions. Thus, the trigger for constitutional protections became
not what the officer did, but who the officer approached. What
follows catalogues some of the unintended consequences that flow
from differential standards for stops of juveniles and concludes that
In re I.R.T's modification of the free-to-leave test demands
reconsideration.
A. Age, If Considered, Will Almost Always Prove Determinative in
the Seizure Inquiry
First, the court's novel approach to investigative stops has the
unintended consequence of expanding Fourth Amendment
protections to almost any police-juvenile encounter because the
suspect's age, if considered, will inevitably prove determinative in the
seizure analysis. Although the free-to-leave test traditionally
considers surrounding circumstances to determine if a reasonable
person would feel free to leave, In re I.R.T. held age to be a distinct
factor, thereby reorienting the seizure analysis to take account of a
juvenile's perspective. 62 However, the court offered no guidance on
how officers should (or even could) adjust their conduct or
questioning when approaching a juvenile suspect so as to avoid a
coercive show of authority. It remains maddeningly unclear how an
officer may rephrase her questions or requests to appropriately and
reasonably interact with a juvenile suspect under In re LR. T. without
invoking the Fourth Amendment. Is "please remove the object from
your mouth" too commanding for a juvenile? Will some other
platitude suffice?
The result of this ambiguity is that age becomes a wild card in the
seizure analysis. As a practical matter, age will only enter the seizure
inquiry in close cases, because encounters in which an officer clearly
displays physical force or makes coercive commands will be deemed a
160. See supra Part I.
161. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("We conclude that a
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave.").
162. In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 584, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2007) ("Thus, we hold
that the age of a juvenile is a relevant factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
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seizure regardless.16 3 If the judge finds it necessary to consider a
defendant's age in a particular case, it will inevitably prove
determinative and thereby encourage a precedent that could
transform virtually any police-juvenile encounter into an
investigatory stop. If taken to its logical conclusion, therefore, In re
LR. T. would require police officers first to have reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity before even casually questioning any juvenile on
the street. As explained below, such sweeping changes to the pre-
adjudicative process for juvenile defendants suggests that the
modification of the free-to-leave test to account for age is a task that
is best left to the legislature rather than the courts.
A careful reading of In re LR.T.'s holding reveals that the
defendant's age ultimately proved determinative in the court's seizure
analysis. Apart from the defendant's age, the court pointed to only
three other factors to support its finding that the officer's show of
authority constituted an investigatory stop: (1) two officers arrived on
the scene in marked cars; (2) one officer's holstered gun was visible;
and (3) the officers wore shirts with a gang unit emblem.16' However,
each of these factors has been rejected by the United States Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina as significant indicia
of a seizure under the free-to-leave test. 165
In United States v. Drayton,'66 the United States Supreme Court
held that citizens were not seized when three armed police officers
displayed their badges and requested in a nonthreatening tone that
bus passengers consent to a search.' 67 Further, the Court noted that
even though the officers were visibly armed, that fact alone would not
be given much weight in determining whether consent was coerced.168
In fact, the Court went so far as to assert that the presence of
uniformed, visibly armed officers "is cause for assurance, not
discomfort."' 69 As Justice Kennedy explained, "[t]hat most law
enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known to the public. The
presence of a holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the
coerciveness of the encounter absent active brandishing of the
163. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
164. LR.T., 184 N.C. App. at 584, 647 S.E.2d at 134.
165. United States v. Dayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204-05 (2002); State v. Farmer, 333 N.C.
172, 187, 424 S.E.2d 120, 129 (1993); see, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 638
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the limited examples in which the Court has
found a seizure of the person).
166. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
167. Id. at 203.
168. Id. at 204-05.
169. Id. at 204.
2010] 1413
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
weapon."' 7° As the officer's weapon was not removed from its holster
or used to threaten the suspects, the Court concluded the encounter
did not constitute a seizure under the free-to-leave test.
171
Drayton helps to illuminate the dispositive weight the In re I.R. T.
court placed on age.172 In contrast to Drayton, In re LR.T. involved
only two officers who merely wore a gang emblem on their shirts
rather than displaying a badge.7 7 Further, no evidence suggests the
officers brandished weapons or used a threatening tone when they
requested that I.R.T. remove the object from his mouth.'74 Lastly, the
officers encountered I.R.T. in an open space outside an apartment
complex, rather than inside the confines of a bus.175 As Drayton
clearly holds that requests made by uniformed, armed police officers
do not result in a seizure,176 I.R.T.'s age emerges as the determinative
factor since the other circumstances of the encounter would not
otherwise suffice to invoke the Fourth Amendment. Had the officers
approached a defendant just a few years older and proceeded to ask
the exact same questions under the exact same circumstances, the
constitutional protections afforded I.R.T. would disappear.
Similarly, in State v. Farmer177 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that no seizure occurred when two officers in a patrol
car stopped a man walking along the side of the road and engaged
him in conversation.'78 After a few minutes of questioning, the
officers asked the defendant to sit and wait in the squad car until
other investigators could join them, and the defendant complied.179
The court determined there was no seizure despite the number of
officers present at the scene, the arrival of the officers in a vehicle
while the defendant was on foot, and the officers' request that the
defendant wait for a period of time in the police car.
80
A comparison of the factors considered in Farmer and the factors
considered in In re I.R. T. yet again reveals the dispositive weight the
court attached to I.R.T.'s age. Farmer involved only one suspect
170. Id. at 205.
171. Id.
172. See In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 584, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2007).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 581, 647 S.E.2d at 132. In Drayton, Justice Kennedy explained, "[i]t is
beyond question that had this encounter occurred on the street, it would be
constitutional." Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204.
175. LR. T., 184 N.C. App. at 581,647 S.E.2d at 132.
176. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204-05.
177. 333 N.C. 172,424 S.E.2d 120 (1993).
178. Id. at 180, 424 S.E.2d at 125.
179. Id. at 182, 424 S.E.2d at 126.
180. Id. at 187, 424 S.E.2d at 129.
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outnumbered by multiple police officers, 8  whereas In re I.R.T.
involved two officers who approached a group of teenagers."
Further, the requests made of the suspect in Farmer constituted a far
greater intrusion on the suspect's freedom of movement than under
In re I.R. T., where the officer simply requested that the juvenile spit
out what was in his mouth as he spoke. 183 Thus, consideration of the
defendant's age in the seizure analysis ultimately proved dispositive
and drastically changed the result.
The In re I.R. T. court's approach to juvenile stops is subtle, but
has a significant effect: police conduct that otherwise would not
constitute an investigative stop does when the defendant is a juvenile.
Age inevitably proves determinative in the seizure inquiry because
the same police conduct will have different constitutional
consequences depending on the juvenile status of the defendant.
Under the In re LR. T. court's analysis, it would appear that whenever
a minor is approached by more than one police officer possessing a
holstered weapon and brandishing no more than questions or
requests, the protections of the Fourth Amendment are immediately
triggered. 8" As police often work in pairs, are often armed, and often
wear uniforms, 85 the unintended consequence of the court's approach
is to automatically transform almost any casual police encounter with
a juvenile into an investigatory stop, as the officer's conduct will likely
be construed as a show of authority.86 However, if police approach a
defendant who has reached the age of majority, those constitutional
protections evaporate and the officer is permitted to ask the same
questions, make the same requests, and obtain a consensual search
free of coercion."8 Thus, the court's approach disproportionately
expands Fourth Amendment protections exclusively for juveniles
despite the fact that minors are no less capable of criminal activities
like drug trafficking than those who have reached the age of
majority. 8
181. Id. at 180-84, 424 S.E.2d at 125-27.
182. In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 581,647 S.E.2d 129, 132 (2007).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 584-85, 647 S.E.2d at 134.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204-05 (2002) ("Officers are
often required to wear uniforms .... That most law enforcement officers are armed is a
fact well known to the public.").
186. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 5.1.4.1.3 n.68.
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., ARNOLD BINDER ET AL., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: HISTORICAL,
CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 10-23 (3d ed. 2001) (summarizing data on the
extent of criminal activity by juveniles).
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The potential for conflict between the In re I.R. T. court's novel
approach to juvenile stops and the traditional presumption that not
all police-juvenile encounters qualify as seizures... also suggests that
the modification of the seizure analysis to account for age is a matter
best left to the General Assembly, rather than the courts. At the close
of the nineteenth century, state legislatures across the country
(including North Carolina) began enacting statutory juvenile justice
codes that established a nonadversarial, civil judicial proceeding that
aimed at rehabilitation of juvenile offenders rather than
punishment."9 In keeping with the "protective rather than the
punitive nature of the juvenile process,"'' the role of law
enforcement officers in handling juveniles has traditionally been seen
as a paternalistic one in which police are encouraged to interact with
juveniles to promote discipline and safety.' 92 For example, the North
Carolina Juvenile Code provides that a law enforcement officer may
take a juvenile into "temporary custody" if the officer reasonably
believes the individual is an "undisciplined juvenile."' 93 The term
"undisciplined juvenile" is broadly defined to include activities that
are well outside the realm of the criminal law as applied to adults. 94
In particular, this provision permits law enforcement officers to
temporarily detain juveniles who are "regularly disobedient" or who
have simply run away from home. 95 Thus, the General Assembly's
statutory scheme for juvenile offenders seems to contemplate and
encourage a broader range of interactions between police officers and
juveniles in an effort to promote the best interest of the child and pre-
empt the social evils that lead to delinquency. 96
As explained above, however, the In re LR.T. court's
modification of the free-to-leave test has the effect of increasing the
frequency with which courts will find that a police encounter with a
juvenile was so inherently coercive as to rise to the level of an
investigatory stop."9 Thus, the court's approach to juvenile stops
189. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 5.1.1.3.
190. See, e.g., SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 1-8 (2d ed. 2009). In North
Carolina, a separate court system for juveniles was first created in 1915. Act of Mar. 9,
1915, ch. 222, § 2, 1915 N.C. Pub. Laws 294. The modem version of North Carolina's
juvenile justice code was adopted in 1979. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 966.
191. DAVIS, supra note 190, at 60-68.
192. Id.
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1900 (2009).
194. Id.
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(27) (2009).
196. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1500 (2009); In re Shue, 63 N.C. App. 76, 81, 303
S.E.2d 636, 639 (1983); In re Wichard, 8 N.C. App 154, 161, 174 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1970).
197. See supra notes 161-88 and accompanying text.
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actually discourages rather than encourages casual police interactions
with juveniles on the street-a result that seems at odds with the
legislative policies underpinning the code that aimed at a less
adversarial approach to juvenile justice.'98 As In re I.R.T. poses
potential conflicts with the General Assembly's carefully crafted
statutory scheme for juvenile offenders, fundamental changes to the
pre-adjudicative process of juvenile defendants-such as imposing
differential standards for juvenile stops-are better left to the
judgment of the legislature rather than the courts.199
B. Fostering Uncertainty in Police Investigations
A second unintended consequence of differential standards for
juvenile stops is the fostering of uncertainty in police investigations.
By giving dispositive weight to the defendant's age, the court
categorically lowers the threshold for the invocation of constitutional
protections in only one context: the casual police questioning of
juveniles. However, for police patrolling their beat it is not always
possible to distinguish clearly between juveniles and young adults.2"
The effect is to infuse a dangerous level of doubt and hesitation in law
enforcement, as police officers are forced to guess as to when their
conduct will implicate Fourth Amendment protections.20 1 As the
work of police officers in the field becomes more difficult, the safety
of all citizens is reduced.2'
Under In re I.R. 's approach, officers will have to determine if
an individual is a minor before approaching them on the street in
order to effectively comply with the differential standards for juvenile
198. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1500 (2009); DAVIS, supra note 190, at 60-69,77-85.
199. In fact, the juvenile code itself provides some support for the notion that
establishing differential standards for juveniles under the seizure analysis is better
conceived as a legislative rather than judicial task. For example, under § 7B-2101, the
General Assembly specifically addressed mandatory procedures for police interrogations
of juveniles. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2009). This special legislative adjustment of
the pre-adjudicative process requires that if a juvenile suspect is less than fourteen years of
age, no confession may be admitted into evidence unless the juvenile's parent or guardian
was present during police interrogations. Id. As the General Assembly saw it as its
prerogative to step in and provide specific mandates for juveniles in the interrogation
context, it seems that other changes to the pre-adjudicative process of juvenile defendants
(like differential standards for seizures of juveniles) are likewise better left to the General
Assembly.
200. See, e.g., In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 501 n.5 (D.C. 1992) (acknowledging that the
officer was not even questioned whether he recognized the appellant to be a juvenile or
young adult when he approached him and conversed with him).
201. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 5.1.4.1, at 163 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486
U.S. 567, 575 (1988)).
202. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
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stops. Although the age of young children is very apparent, it is
unlikely officers would have a need to interrogate young children.
Adolescents pose the biggest problem, as common sense suggests
some adolescents will appear older while others will appear younger
than they really are. As an officer cannot accurately gauge the age of
a suspect upon first approach, the officer has no way of knowing
whether her questions will constitute a display of coercive authority,
thereby implicating the Fourth Amendment.2"3 The officer is forced to
guess and may guess wrong in either direction. For example, the
officer may approach a citizen that easily passes for a male in his
twenties and engage him in conversation. Yet, if the citizen is in
reality a minor, a court following In re I.R. T. may be inclined to hold
the encounter constituted an investigatory stop and exclude from trial
the results of the officer's investigation.2" On the other hand, an
officer may wrongly guess that an adult is an adolescent and thereby
avoid questioning that individual altogether or temper her
questioning to such an extent that the investigation becomes
ineffective. Such uncertainty and vacillation in law enforcement
investigations could place at risk the safety and security of many
communities.2 5
As courts and commentators have repeatedly emphasized,
effective law enforcement needs clear, uniform standards to guide
officers' conduct that are " 'consistent in application from one police
encounter to the next' and permit[] police 'to determine in advance
whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth
Amendment.' ,206 The analysis must remain objective because a
police officer must be able to predict in advance whether or not her
actions will escalate the encounter into an investigative stop.27 If the
test loses its objectivity, it becomes meaningless as a gauge of what
police conduct will or will not implicate those constitutional
protections. The result is a lack of uniformity in police behavior in the
field which renders police conduct far more difficult for courts to
evaluate objectively. Thus, differential standards for investigatory
stops only increase uncertainty among police and ambiguity for the
203. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
204. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 1.2.3.
205. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
206. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a), at 416 (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 575 (1988)).
207. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 641 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988)).
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courts interpreting their behavior, thereby decreasing effective
deterrence of abusive police practices.2 °8
Moreover, the In re .R.T court's approach dramatically limits
law enforcement investigation of criminal activity by minors because
valid consensual searches become more difficult in the wake of
heightened ambiguity as to when police interactions with juveniles
will constitute a show of authority. 2 9 Given the determinative weight
the In re LR.T. court placed on age, it is hard to imagine many
scenarios where a uniformed police officer with a holstered gun may
ask questions of a juvenile and not implicate constitutional
protections.210 Thus, In re LR. T's approach threatens to eliminate one
highly effective and heretofore frequently employed police
investigation technique: eliciting cooperation by juveniles and their
consent to a search.11 If a street encounter between the police and a
juvenile is as inherently coercive as the In re LR.T court suggests,
there seem to be few opportunities for an officer to obtain a juvenile's
voluntary consent to a search. Moreover, should the encounter be
deemed an investigatory stop for which the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion, evidence obtained from what the officer believed to be a
consensual search will likely be suppressed. 213 Thus, the modification
of the free-to-leave test to account for age presents significant
substantive and procedural obstacles to police investigation of crime
by blurring the line between the legal formulae for consent to a
search versus the seizure of the person.214 Differential standards for
juvenile stops increase uncertainty for officers in the field, thus
decreasing our collective security.15 Further, such a differential
approach would make uniform standards of police behavior
208. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
209. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 5.1.4.1.2 n.68.
210. See supra Part IV.A.
211. See CLANCY, supra note 42, § 10.4.1 (noting that consensual searches are "one of
the most common of all searches").
212. See id. ("The only situations where lack of consent has been found [based on the
characteristics of the suspect] are those where some form of coercion or assertion of
authority served to negate any 'consent.' ").
213. Commentators have noted that "]t]he evidence subject to exclusion includes direct
evidence and evidence obtained through the exploitation of the illegal conduct known as
the 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' " PARSONS, supra note 41, at 77-86 (quoting Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
214. The consent inquiry and the seizure inquiry are often confusingly intermingled
because both inquiries often involve the very same set of facts. See CLANCY, supra note
42, § 10.4.2.1.
215. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
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impossible, thereby rendering police conduct more difficult to
evaluate and abusive practices more difficult to deter.
C. Establishing a "Slippery Slope" Precedent
Lastly, the In re LR. T. court's approach to the free-to-leave test
has the potential to lead Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in North
Carolina down a slippery slope.216 If age is assumed a relevant
consideration in determining when a reasonable person would feel
free to disengage from police questioning, the floodgates open for
other individual characteristics to be explicitly incorporated into the
analysis, such as race, gender, economic status, and intelligence
quotient. 17 As Professor LaFave has stated, "use of a 'reasonable
youth' test would doubtless prompt imaginative defense counsel to
seek recognition in other cases of 'reasonable woman,' 'reasonable
black' ... and similar variations." '218 Each of these minority groups
can point to empirical evidence supporting an argument for
differential treatment under the seizure analysis that is just as
legitimate (if not more legitimate) than that of juveniles. 19 For
example, commentators have suggested that police encounters with
adult African American males often invoke measurably more anxiety,
tension, and intimidation.2 If adolescents are afforded differential
treatment because they are more susceptible to police intimidation,
there seems to be little reason not to extend differential standards to
racial groups who similarly experience heightened pressures when
questioned by police.221 Further, it could be argued that women or the
elderly may feel less free to leave when approached by uniformed
police officers than would other reasonable people.22 Should not
their feelings be accounted for as well?
216. See id. (questioning whether consideration of age in the seizure analysis would




219. See, e.g., id. (citing cases regarding stops of minority groups); Maclin, supra note
69, at 250 (discussing police stops of African Americans). Even in ruling on the
constitutionality of "stop and frisks" by police, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
minority groups generally (and African Americans particularly) often complain of
"wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
220. See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a); Maclin, supra note 69, at 250
(discussing whether race should matter in the seizure analysis); Thompson, supra note 8, at
983-93 (discussing racially motivated police stops and interpreting social science data).
221. See Maclin, supra note 69, at 250.
222. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
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Although questions of social justice and fairness in law
enforcement are of profound importance, little can be gained on that
front by attempts to refashion the reasonable person standard as an
instrument of political correctness. If all of these individual variations
are taken into account in the seizure analysis, the free-to-leave test
would be rendered essentially meaningless and unworkable as a
gauge of appropriate police conduct.223 By what measure can courts
accurately and fairly differentiate between police questioning of
suspects that are female rather than male, African American rather
than Latino, or thirteen rather than sixteen years old? The benefits of
an objective test that supplies uniform standards of police behavior to
deter police abuses outweigh the cost of failing to recognize that
individuals have disparate subjective reactions to police presence.
Drawing a clear and consistent distinction between a consensual
police-citizen encounter and an investigatory stop is essential if courts
are to distinguish legitimate law enforcement practices necessary for
effective criminal investigations from the unreasonable intrusions on
our privacy and autonomy prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 24
The over-subjectification of the free-to-leave test renders both the
prevention of crime as well as the prevention of police abuse of the
innocent more difficult by forcing law enforcement to guess as to
whether their actions or questions on particular occasions with
particular classes of citizens are constitutionally permissible.225 As the
Court in Mendenhall noted,
characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the
police as a "seizure," while not enhancing any interest secured
by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic
restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement
practices ... "without such investigation, those who were
innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might
wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go
unsolved. In short, the security of all would be diminished. 226
As police need flexibility to effectively investigate and deter
crime in the field, an objective test remains a necessity to provide
practical guidance as to what police conduct will or will not implicate
223. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); 4 LAFAVE, supra note
15, § 9.4(a).
224. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,635-36 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 641 (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988)).
226. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
225 (1973)).
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constitutional protections.227 Establishing differential standards for
juveniles creates a slippery slope that risks subjectifying the free-to-
leave test to such an extent that it would become a hollow measure of
appropriate police behavior and far less effective as a tool to combat
abuses of police power.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the court's decision in In re I.R. T. represents a subtle yet
significant break with traditional Fourth Amendment analysis by
considering a suspect's age to be relevant, if not determinative, in the
seizure inquiry. The subjectification of the free-to-leave test to
account for individual variations lingers as a tempting yet specious
remedy for the admitted artificiality of a legal test that assumes any
person would feel free to disengage from police questioning without
consequence. Unexpected encounters with law enforcement are often
a source of anxiety and intimidation. Further, the level of intimidation
an individual experiences derives from multiple sources, some of
which may very well reflect the greater evils of injustice and
inequality in our society. However, courts must be cautious. The free-
to-leave test is not and was never meant to be a platform for social
justice concerns nor an accurate reflection of human psychology.
Rather, it serves as a simple tool to gauge objectively the contours of
appropriate police conduct. The problems that inevitably result from
subjectifying the seizure inquiry are exemplified here: imposing
differential standards for investigatory stops to account for age
exponentially increases the circumstances in which a police-juvenile
encounter will be deemed a seizure. Further, the court's approach
fosters uncertainty by forcing police to guess when their conduct is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment thereby frustrating police
investigatory techniques essential to effective deterrence of crime.
Lastly, the court's approach to juvenile stops establishes a slippery
slope precedent that encourages overreaching by judges to
incorporate other individual variations into the seizure analysis that
risk rendering the test meaningless as a gauge of proper police
conduct and ineffective as a check on abusive police behavior. Given
the unintended consequences resulting from the court's modification
of the seizure analysis, a reconsideration of In re I.R.T.'s holding is
already overdue.
JONATHAN S. CARTER
227. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 9.4(a).
[Vol. 881422
